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PEACE ORGANISATION AFTER THE WAR :

A Review of Some Schemes of Reconstruction.

BY

THE RIGHT HON. J. M. ROBERTSON, M.P.


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AN INTRODUCTION

BY

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AN INTRODUCTION.

I have been asked to write a few words of introduction to Mr. Robertson's pamphlet on "Peace Organisation After the War." To me it would be a pleasure to be associated with my friend on such a subject, but I cannot persuade myself that an introduction from me, or from anyone else, is needed. Mr. Robertson is remarkable among writers for the logic, clearness, and force with which he states his views, and he may be trusted to maintain and defend them against all comers if they are attacked. I have read the proofs of his article with care and with general agreement.

In some quarters there is much foolish impatience—if indeed all impatience is not foolish—directed against those who venture to suggest plans for dealing with after-war problems. "Let us finish the war" cry the impatient ones, "then it will be soon enough to consider what we shall do afterwards." Certainly the main thing is to end the war speedily and satisfactorily. But is it not also of the utmost importance to seek means to prevent the recurrence of such a world-wide cataclysm as that which is now devastating the largest and most powerful nations of the earth? If we cannot entirely abolish war we should assuredly strive to the uttermost to narrow its bounds, and, as far as possible, to mitigate its horrors.

We of the International Arbitration League and others have for many years advocated arbitration, and to give effect to that principle we have urged, as our American friends have urged, the establishment of a High Court of Nations for the peaceful settlement of international differences. Recent events are supposed to have discredited these methods. It is the fashion among shallow critics to ridicule arbitration and to laugh cynically at Hague Conferences, because, forsooth, they have not prevented the outbreak of the most terrible war in the world's history. It would be as irrational to cast ridicule on the judicial systems of nations because they have not abolished all crime and black-guardism. Arbitration has certainly prevented many wars. Do not let us forget that for a hundred years Great Britain and our kinsmen across the Atlantic have settled their disputes, some of them most delicate and acute, by treaties of arbitration.

International organisation—the federation of the nations of the world—is one of the great needs of the future. That is a

stupendous task. It is not easy to organise individuals, but to organise nations is infinitely more difficult. When Tennyson "dipped into the future" he foresaw the time when "the war-drum would throb no longer, and the battle flags be furled, in the Parliament of man, the federation of the world." That time may be far off, but it is worth while to strive to bring it nearer. If civilisation has to survive, if it has to be a verity, the vision of the poet must become a grand reality.

The "League to Enforce Peace" has recently attracted much attention, and has received influential support from leading statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic. We owe its inception to America, a country which for a century has been in the van of every movement for developing and perfecting international law. Some of the best and most highly trained minds, legal and other, of that great Republic are at the present time directing their energies and their ingenuity to devise methods for the peaceful settlement of international differences. Though the League began in the United States, its foundations were laid at the first Hague Conference.

A League to *Enforce* Peace is something of a novelty. Force is frankly recognised as a part of the machinery to ensure the security of nations. The idea is that nations shall not stand aside with folded arms in the presence of the aggressor, but that the ruffian-nation shall be overpowered, placed in a strait-jacket, and kept under control until sanity has returned and until he has learnt better manners. This should appeal not only to the peace-at-any-price man, if such there be, but also to the war-at-any-price man, who certainly exists.

The fundamental principles on which the League is based may be summarised in a few words: (1) That every people shall determine its own sovereignty and control its own affairs; (2) that small States shall have the same rights of self-government as the more powerful nations; (3) that the world has the right to be free from every disturbance that has its origin in aggression and the disregard of the rights of peoples and nations.

President Wilson, in addressing the League, delivered a striking speech in which he made the following notable declaration: "No nation can any longer remain neutral as against any wilful disturbance of the peace of the world." Coming from a man who has striven to the utmost of his power to maintain the neutrality of his own great country the importance of such a statement cannot be exaggerated. In the same speech he further

declared " that the principle of public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations, and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that right prevails as against any sort of selfish aggression." After quoting the principles above summarised, President Wilson proceeded to say: " I am sure I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed to realise these objects and to make them secure against violation."

The League beyond doubt has powerful support in America. Mr. Taft, a former President, is its chairman; Mr. Wilson, as we have seen, as well as Mr. Hughes, the Republican candidate for the Presidency, Mr. Roosevelt, and other prominent men have strongly declared in its favour.

On this side of the Atlantic the League has already been received with great approval by some of our most distinguished statesmen. M. Briand has given it his blessing. In our own country Viscount Grey, Lord Bryce, and others have spoken or written in its favour, and its principle is embodied in Mr. Asquith's declaration that " Britain is fighting for the public law of Europe." Viscount Grey, in his memorable, inspiring speech to the Foreign Press Association, after heartily commending the League, appealed strongly to neutral nations, who are less absorbed in the maelstrom of the war than are the belligerents, to prepare the way " for some international association, after this war is over, which shall do its part in making peace secure in the future." We should all do our utmost to attain that great object.

THOMAS BURT.

PEACE ORGANISATION AFTER THE WAR.

§ 1.

A useful service was rendered some time ago by Mr. E. W. Tucker and the New York journal, "The Survey," in tabulating "Twenty-two Constructive Programs for Peace and World Organisation" in a chart, which has been re-issued this year by the Neutral Conference for Continual Mediation at Stockholm. The groups or conferences represented are:—

1. International Congress of Women at The Hague.
2. Central Organisation for a Durable Peace, Hague.
3. International Peace Bureau, Belgium.
4. World Peace Foundation, Boston.
5. Eighth Northern Peace Congress, Copenhagen.
6. General Swedish Peace Congress, Varberg.
7. Women's Peace Party, United States.
8. Emergency Federation of Peace, Chicago Branch.
9. League to Enforce Peace, American Branch.
10. New York Peace Society.
11. Bund "Neues Vaterland," Germany.
12. National Peace Council, Great Britain.
13. Union of Democratic Control, Great Britain.
14. Fabian Society, Great Britain.
15. Dutch Anti-War Council.
16. Swiss Committee for a Durable Peace.
17. American Socialist Party.
18. South German Social Democrats.
19. German and Austro-Hungarian Socialists, Vienna.
20. French General Confederation of Labour.
21. Secretary of Union of International Associations, Brussels.
22. "The Independent," New York.

Strictly, the last two do not fully enter into the scheme of the chart; but their proposals are quite schematic enough to be entitled to consideration on their merits; and the same may be said of a number of individual publications in different countries, which probably represent as considerable sections of public opinion as are covered by a number of the group-pronouncements. It will probably not be disputed that all alike speak only for rather small minorities; but as this means for certain only that the great majority in all countries have not yet committed themselves, no conclusion as to the practicability of any one scheme is reasonably to be grounded on the largeness or smallness of the organisation behind it. For the same reason, individual pronouncements are as well worth weighing as those of groups. Among those which I have read are:—

1. "A Council of the Nations." By O. F. Maclagan. Garden City Press, Letchworth.

2. "The League of Nations Society." Garden City Press, Letchworth.

3. "Proposals for the Avoidance of Wars." Privately circulated. With prefatory note by Lord Bryce.

4. "The League to Enforce Peace." Speech by Mr. Taft.

5. "The European Anarchy." By G. Lowes Dickinson. Allen and Unwin.

6. "After the War." By G. Lowes Dickinson. Fifeild.

7. "European International Relations." By J. A. Murray Macdonald. Fisher Unwin.

8. "The Two Roads." By H. E. Hyde. King and Son.

9. "Towards International Government." By J. A. Hobson. Allen and Unwin.

10. "Proposals for a League of Peace." By Aneurin Williams, M.P.

11. "Shall this War End German Militarism?" By Norman Angell. U.D.C.

12. "The Morrow of the War." U.D.C.

13. "Britain's Great Opportunity." By Charles E. Innes. Birmingham Printers, Limited.

This body of propaganda may be taken to present a sufficiently general view of the present movement of constructive thought among peace-lovers throughout the world, apart from Asia; and the object of the present brief survey is to attempt an estimate of the practical possibilities as distinguished from the ideals expounded.

§ 2.

The conception most nearly common to all the schemes is one of international concert for the preservation of peace (presumably) by force—a proposal long familiar to peace-lovers and likely now to be accepted by a far larger body of opinion than was ever secured for it in the past. Among the 22 bodies of our first list the following formulate it thus:—

4. European concert with representative council.

5. An alliance between the civilised nations for peace, free trade, etc., and in connection with this, the establishment of a world Parliament.

6. The union of civilised nations for peace; the creation of a universal Parliament; the establishment of a powerful international executive.

7. Concert of nations.

8. The same.

11. Development of international organisation.

12. Formation of a permanent Congress of Nations, composed of delegates appointed by the Parliaments.

13. Establishment of a concert of the Powers.

15. Co-operation between States.

16. International organisation. Arbitration.

17. International congress with legislative and administrative powers over international affairs, with permanent committees in place of secret diplomacy.

18. Confederacy of all European States. Alliance of all against aggressor. International Parliaments and permanent international committees "in place of diplomacy."

20. Federation of nations.

21. International Parliament with two Houses, the lower composed of delegates from the various Parliaments; upper of delegates from the international associations "representing the fundamental social forces."

22. A periodical [international] assembly of the nations in the league to make all rules, "to become law unless vetoed by a nation within a stated period."

In addition to these specific proposals for international organisation we have these more or less practical equivalents:—

1. Permanent international court of justice to settle all justiciable questions.

2. A permanent court of international justice.

9. All justiciable questions to be submitted to a judicial tribunal.

14. International high court for decision of justiciable issues (one member from each of eight great Powers; seven from all the lesser Powers). International Council to legislate subject to ratification by the States.

19. Development of international arbitration courts.

Equally general is the agreement of the independent publicists. The main element of difference on the face of the case is as to whether the international organisation shall or shall not coerce either its own members or outsiders who persist in refusing arbitration in a national quarrel. In addition to this there is the serious difficulty involved in the phrase "justiciable questions," which seems to leave open an indefinite number of *casus belli*, to be left to the nations to fight upon as in the past. In this Mr. Lowes Dickinson acquiesces without making clear his principle of discrimination. Yet another problem not visibly provided for is the question whether the British Self-Governing Dominions shall be represented separately or not.

Finally, there emerges the greatest difficulty of all: Shall the Central Powers, Bulgaria, and what may be left of Turkey be, in the first instance, invited or admitted into the League or Union?

§ 3.

All of the problems before us may perhaps be best approached by asking the question, What is likely to be *attainable* in the way of international co-operation immediately after the War?

To which we may answer:—

a. The common objection to “secret diplomacy” (a phrase to be discussed later) would seem to be in part met at once by the continuance, for peace purposes, of the existing Entente of the nine Powers: Russia, France, Britain, Belgium, Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro, Portugal, Japan.

b. Into that Entente would presumably be welcomed all the Powers now neutral which were ready to enter.

c. The general peace principle of such an expanded Entente or League would presumably be that every member agreed (1) to submit every question involving war to arbitration, and (2) to combine forces, upon an agreed-on scale, to resist any aggressor within or without the League.

This is already a great measure of systematic provision for the world's peace; but I incline to believe that the nations in general are really ready for it. So far as I have been able to ascertain, public opinion among the European neutrals is broadly in favour of such an arrangement. And it should be noted that, though an agreement to use force against an aggressor where necessary seems rather essential, a simple trade boycott would in most cases be likely to suffice to coerce any Power, or even a group of two or three. The Dutch Anti-War Council, which has circulated a set of three questions, the first two relating to the future activity of the Hague Conference, and the third putting the issue of the international use of force against aggressors, has received fewer assents to the last than to the others, some of the objectors (for instance, Miss Ellen Key, Sweden) holding that such a procedure is “desirable but, alas, not possible yet.” On the other hand, Mr. Maclagan, in his pamphlet, “A Council of the Nations,” stipulates that the League in resisting an aggressor shall not invade his territory, though it may attack his ships and aircraft outside of his three-mile limit. At the same time, Mr. Maclagan would enforce indemnities, which he thinks—possibly with justice—could be extorted by economic pressure.

There arise here, however, two difficulties. (1) Why should it be pre-determined that no aggressor shall ever be mulcted in territory? (2) Supposing that at some future time Germany, after accumulating submarines and food supplies, should commence a submarine war against British commerce, it might be a long time before she could be paralysed by economic pressure; and in the meantime, for lack of a land attack on German territory with adequate forces, the British food supply might be disastrously curtailed. It will be seen, I think, that the question is more complicated than Mr. Maclagan thinks. Mr. Lowes Dickinson

and some, if not all, of his colleagues support the principle of the use of force, as does Mr. Hobson; and this, I think, is by far the preponderant view.

The most serious element of dissent is the proposition put by Mr. Taft on behalf of the American Branch of the League to Enforce Peace, that if after full discussion "a nation still thinks that it must vindicate its rights by war we do not attempt in this plan to prevent it by force." Such a policy leaves a great gap in the machinery of future peace preservation; and it is to be hoped that the principle of enforcement will be adopted. As one who deprecated that policy in the past, when formulated with an eye to a limited Alliance, and in particular to a mere League of the English-Speaking Peoples, I would now urge that a really broad basis would remove the main ground for objection, and that the present war has given a decisive proof of the need for such a provision.

§ 4.

We now come to the proposals for Reduction of Armaments, as to which there is as much agreement among peace-lovers as on the question of international control, but for which the opinion of the world in general is probably not so ripe. Here, however, there is every reason to hope for agreement throughout the Entente. In the first place, most of the Entente Powers *must* have some reduction of armaments, even with reference to their pre-war burdens. Russia and France alike need that for purposes of industrial recuperation; and the demand that Britain shall after the war maintain a conscript Army on the Continental scale, *in addition to maintaining a preponderant Navy*, is put forward only by people who have never calculated the economic possibilities. Even before the war, such a burden would have been ruinous: added to a national debt of four or more thousand millions, it would mean simple economic collapse.

Some difficulty, perhaps, may be found in obtaining assent even to our maintenance of a preponderant Navy, which in the present posture of international affairs is simply vital to us; and the surest way to secure agreement on that head is to return to something like the pre-war footing as regards land power. A Britain with a small Army cannot be considered a danger to any of the Entente Powers, or to any neutral who may join their alliance for peace purposes.

A rational basis for a League of Peace would be a general restriction of land armaments to the needs of the League as a whole to protect any or all of its members. The figures of one soldier per 100 or 1,000 inhabitants have been suggested; but it is obvious that regard must be had to naval as well as to land power; and that the quotas of the members of the League must be calculated with regard to the total number of entrants.

On the other hand, it seems to me practically essential to anything like security that the Central Powers should as a preliminary be forced to reduce *their* armaments to a size which shall leave them no longer a deadly danger to Europe; and that any breach of the agreement by them shall be a *casus belli* for the League against them. They have been the most unscrupulous and systematic aggressors in the modern world; and it is against the danger from their side that a League of Peace is in the first instance necessary. The great trouble is that precisely at the point where German aggression is most dangerous to our own country—submarine war—secret preparation is most easy; and it is on that score that we are bound both to maintain a relatively strong Navy and to call for a policy of defensive union by land on the part of the Entente. And such a policy is indeed as important for several neutrals as for ourselves.

Given agreement on these heads, it may be found necessary to adjust the question of land armaments in a spirit of compromise. Different States may claim different degrees of necessity for land armaments. But that there *will* be an all-round reduction of armaments, even from the pre-war standard, I take to be certain.

§ 5.

More serious, perhaps, is the problem as to the entrance of the Central Powers into a general League of Peace immediately after the war. On this Mr. Dickinson and Mr. Hobson insist as a *sine qua non*: we cannot, they say, have complete security unless all the present belligerents are included. My own answer is that I do not look for such complete security in my lifetime, however that might be protracted. I cannot conceive that Europe will be out of all danger from the German cultus of militarism and domination until there has been time for a cultural reversal of the political religion which has been developed in Germany during whole generations. Most of the arguments advanced in favour of an immediate admission of the Central Powers to a League of Peace based on the Entente seem to me to prove the very opposite of what they aim at. We are told, for instance, that ninety-nine Germans and Austro-Hungarians out of a hundred regard themselves as having waged a purely defensive war, and honestly believe the Allies to be the real aggressors. I cannot imagine a stronger argument against an alliance with them. Even their attitude to treaties is not a clearer disability. I cannot conceive, further, how, holding such beliefs, they can sincerely join such an alliance, and if they proposed it I should regard the proposal as part of a policy of treachery.

If, indeed, there were to follow upon the war a real democratic revolution in Germany, involving the overthrow of the present dynasty and oligarchy, it would be difficult to refuse an appeal, backed by the nation as a whole, for a peaceful alliance. But it is idle to discuss such a contingency until it arises; the more so

as there is not the slightest overt prospect of it. The stringent systematic cultus of a century and a-half is not conceivably to be undone in a few years. It will be lucky if in a generation the ideals now absolutely predominant in Germany have been superseded by those of international equality and fraternity.

Mr. Hobson's position, as I understand him, is that modern German policy is a product of Cæsarism and bureaucracy, and does not represent the spirit of the people. I readily agree that the "German spirit" as we have it is a made thing, and may in time be unmade. But the made thing will last till it is unmade; and the German people at this moment, by the avowal of many who deprecate anti-German animus, is educated to the ideal of its educators. The assumption that it can collectively make an ethical somersault and become immediately a loyal member of a League of Peace is for me unthinkable. Nations do not and cannot make lightning changes of that kind. To say "cannot" is not to say that they must be ostracised *because* they have been miseducated. It is merely to say that generations of mis-education create a colossal national fact; and that the rest of us must face the fact.

Many of those who either explicitly or implicitly advocate the immediate inclusion of the Central Powers in a League of Peace appear to me to make a quite erroneous assumption in their use of the terms "diplomacy" and "secret diplomacy." They appear to take it for granted that "diplomats" are always and inevitably warmongers, and "peoples" always pacific and non-aggressive. This is really an unhistorical conception. "Secret diplomacy" has a hundred times prevented wars. Open popular agitation has many times precipitated them; the American war against Spain was so brought about. Spontaneous belligerency is a normal feature of tribal life; and I know of no organised nation that ever became thoroughly non-aggressive until it had been compelled to abandon aggressive ideals. That Germany may be so compelled in time I think quite likely. But that at the outbreak of this war the vast mass of the population in Germany, Austria, and Hungary were enthusiastically belligerent is certain; and it is equally certain that the German mass have delighted in the sinking of passenger ships and the slaying of non-combatants by Zeppelin raids, to say nothing of their denial or dismissal of the facts as to the massacres in Belgium and Armenia.

These things being so, it may perhaps occur to those who crave for the immediate inclusion of the Central Powers in a League of Peace with the Entente Powers that even if their ideal be as admirable as they think it, they cannot rationally *expect* to realise it in the face of the obviously predominant feeling throughout the countries of the Entente. No war in modern history ever evolved so much national hate as this has done; because no war on any similar scale was ever so completely and passionately endorsed by all the nations involved. In the old

wars against Louis XIV. there was no comparable growth of hatred; even in the Napoleonic wars there was always an expectation of ultimate alliance with the anti-Napoleonic element in France, though Prussian hatred against France in general was proportionate to past Prussian humiliation, which had duly followed upon Prussian interference in French affairs. With the mass of Germans hating "England" as they avowedly do; and the mass of Britons feeling as they do about German crime, is there any practical use in planning a fraternal relation with them as soon as the war is over? It will be hard enough to prevent a stupid policy of "trade war" which will lastingly cripple ourselves.

In the face of such a situation, the ingenious scheme formulated by Mr. Hyde in his "Two Roads" seems to me simply Utopian. Mr. Hyde outgoes most of the schemers of international organisation for peace to the extent of planning for an International Military Force, under the control of an International Government, which alone can permit its employment anywhere. Under this system troops of the various nationalities will be distributed non-nationally—British and French and Russian troops in Germany, and German and other foreign troops in Britain. It seems sufficient to point out that no nation will consent to such a system in our day. And, seeing that Mr. Hyde stands upon a fiscal platform of the crudest tariffism, it seems hardly likely that he has accurately foreseen the drift of the future.

§ 6.

A less thorny but still a difficult question is the form of International Council to be set up by the League of Peace. Such a Council seems eminently desirable; but it cannot speedily become anything describable as an International Parliament. I shall be thankful to see constituted in my time an International Council of Conciliation and Arbitration, or two Councils for these purposes. If the Republics of North and South America will join, the peace of the world would be as far secured as can reasonably be hoped for in our day. But the entrance of the United States may not be so facile as some optimists suppose. Mr. Aneurin Williams argues that it would at once secure America against that European intervention which is vetoed by the Monroe Doctrine; but if America enters the League the States will be under the same restriction against aggression as rules the European Powers. They could not be allowed to join in a European intervention without accepting the principle of a European League intervention to guard one American State against the aggression of another. The real argument for the entrance of the United States into a General League of Peace, it seems to me, is that such a League would put American peace on a much higher and securer basis than is afforded by the Monroe Doctrine.

The great thing is to secure the first step—the adhesion of neutrals in general to the League. To obstruct that by preliminary debate as to the constitution of the machinery of conciliation and arbitration would be disastrous; and it would be still more so to stipulate at the outset for an International Parliament or Congress for which the nations are not at all ready. It is significant that a “Confederacy of all European States” and “International Parliaments” are proposed by the South German Socialists, the great majority of whom describe this war, forced on Europe by Austria and Germany, as a war of defence. In view, finally, of the general practice of the nations, it seems idle to propose to make Free Trade part of the basis of any League for Peace.

The evolution of the world towards universal peace will have to proceed, in the first instance, through the machinery of the actually existing Governments. Professed pacifists who merely vilify all that machinery, and call for its supersession by a new machine, are doing little to promote their ideal. Vilification of diplomatists is only too easily met by disparagement of pacifists; and those who talk confidently of the infallible working of an entirely new international machinery of “parliamentary” status invite disparagement. A large stock of patience is as necessary to pacifists as to “professional politicians.”

§ 7.

I am not disposed to complicate this summary survey by discussing the “terms of peace” to be imposed at the close of the war; but I have actually indicated what seems to me one essential safeguard, and I feel bound to notice two conflicting lines of argument in that connection, both posited in the name of peace policy. On the one hand we have Mr. Charles E. Innes, in his pamphlet “Britain’s Great Opportunity to Kill Militarism and to Secure Permanent Peace: The First Step,” urging the imposition of a new constitution on Germany; and on the other hand we have a certain number of demands that no territory shall be alienated save by consent of a plebiscite of its population. Both positions seem to me untenable.

In the first place, it is no business of ours—of the Entente’s—to impose any kind of constitution on Germany. Germany’s constitution is Germany’s business. In the second place, a constitution imposed on a defeated country by the victors would be guaranteed impermanent by the act of imposition. To speak of such a constitution as a “gift” or “boon” to Germany is merely to evade the fact that the gift would be hated. Proposing such a “gift” on the one hand, Mr. Innes on the other appears to deprecate the exaction of either indemnity or territory, on the score that such a policy “will not produce the condition of things which shall make war impossible.” Those who can believe that Germans will be made at once grateful and pacific by “giving” them a constitution for which they do not ask, may make use of

such an argument against compelling them to make compensation for the stupendous destruction they have caused; but it can make no appeal to the possessors of a normal sense of justice. To propose to leave Belgium and Serbia without indemnity on the score that to exact one will make Germans rancorous is surely to take up the weakest of positions, to say nothing of the implicit condonation of German action. Germans in general are at this moment as full of the fiercest rancour as even they can be; they can certainly be no less rancorous when they are finally forced to yield; and if there be a minority who are still undeveloped in that regard, but who will become rabid if Germany is made to pay for her misdeeds, their ethical standard is really not such as need concern us.

It is necessary to stress this point, for the pacifist argument in some hands incurs the danger of falling into a new kind of immoralism. The fallacy of "doing evil that good may come" is familiar; but the policy of "no punishment lest you incense" has the seductiveness of an apparent combination of utilitarianism and magnanimity. Now, mankind cannot yet afford to dispense with the primary instinct of justice; and those who in effect say, "Lest it should seem vindictive, let us exact no penalty for the sin against Serbia and Belgium," are dispensing with one vital moral instinct without putting in action any other. France and Russia in this matter have a case of their own, which our peace formalists ignore. It is always the other people who are to forgive and forgo in order to prevent future bad blood. He who forgives and forgoes for himself is acting morally; he who argues that another, deeply wronged, must forgive and forgo in order that we may all be comfortable afterwards, is putting comfort above rectitude; and all the while is not really calculating very carefully about comfort.

The non-retaliation policy is very temperately urged by the Swiss Committee who publish "The Principles of a Durable Peace," their position being that the taking of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 was a sowing of dragon's teeth, and that such an operation ought not to be repeated. They further point out that the Powers of the Entente, at the outset of the war, denied having gone to war for conquest; and they gently insinuate that to take any territory at the finish is to falsify that announcement. But this is hardly ingenuous. To say: "We are not the aggressors, we desired no conquest, we strove to avoid the war," is not to say: "Whatever the burden laid upon us, whatever the crimes of the aggressors, we shall never take any compensation." Messrs. Nippold, Wiedmer-Stern, and Trösch, the signatories of the Swiss Committee's pamphlet, will perhaps pardon some of us in Britain for asking whether they regard all the belligerents as equally guilty, and whether such a point of view has anything to do with the fact that they themselves are of German race?

But even if we try the issue solely by the test of future utilities, we must go a little further than do those who cry: "No annexation,

lest there be German resentment." Are Germans the only people whose resentment is to count? To say nothing of the fact that the war of 1870 was deliberately engineered by Germany, and that the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was acclaimed with ecstasy by practically all Germany, it is an odd process of reasoning to condemn the act and then conclude: "But, once done, it must not be undone." In 1870 the then small party of German Socialists made an honourable and memorable protest against the annexation, a protest for which Bebel and the elder Liebknecht suffered two years' imprisonment in fortresses. They predicted that the annexation would one day lead to a war with Russia, and would bring on Germany ever-increasing military burdens. Their policy has been strictly fulfilled. Are we then now to say that Alsace-Lorraine, which has always remained French at heart, is to be left in German hands for fear of future consequences? France made no war for its recovery; but when the war is forced on her is she to be asked by us to stay her hand? There are French feelings and Belgian feelings as well as German. When professing to have regard solely to future contingencies, why not take account of the feelings of the mass of the peoples of the Entente in the contingency of Germany going undiminished out of the inferno she has brought upon mankind? And what about the kind of feeling that will be developed in Germany if men there can say: "All Europe could not take Silesia from Frederick after he had annexed it; all Europe cannot even now take back any territory from us." If we are to weigh consequences in one direction, let us, in the name of decent concern for equity and prudence, weigh all the others also.

No reader of this paper, I presume, will dispute that a victorious Germany would certainly annex territory on the largest possible scale, and extort the hugest indemnities she could wring from her victims. If there is a German minority which professes not to know this, it is not one with which it would be profitable to argue.

As to plebiscites of territories to be annexed, they would certainly be pronounced hypocritical formalities; for no vote for annexation would be admitted by the defeated party to have been honestly secured. To claim an overruling right for the newcomers into annexed territory as against their victims, and to argue that no German must be transferred or dispossessed, in face of the fact that substantially all Germans are doing their utmost to dispossess other people, is again to juggle with a humanitarian formula. It was fair to argue in 1870 that the people of Alsace-Lorraine, having had no effective part in causing the war, ought not to have been made to suffer annexation. But the pro-Germans in Alsace have no equivalent case to-day. All the German parties—Socialist, Conservative, Catholic, National Liberal—have endorsed the war by immense majorities; all would have gleefully applauded the annexation of further French territory; and none, therefore, is in a position to say: "You ought

not to coerce me now that we have failed." To give them the benefit of the formula of 1870 is to put a premium upon hypocrisy. Small, honest minorities, I fear, may suffer; that is part of the curse of war, invoked by the vast German majority, but I doubt whether the few German Socialists in Alsace who happen to have opposed and hated the war would feel very seriously wronged if they were transferred to the French flag.

Certainly it is not to be pretended that the infliction of heavy penalties upon Germany and Austria and Turkey—for the last are on the same footing, though most of our pacifists say very little about them—will leave a resigned Germandom. But neither would any other course do so; and it is surely past dispute that an undefeated and undiminished Germany will be *the* supreme danger to European peace. In short, to be content with arguing that the one thing to be considered is the expediency of leaving no bad blood on the German side of things is simply to close one's eyes to nine-tenths of the problem. In the words of Conrad's ship captain, you cannot "get behind the weather" by relying on a formula. No man is secured from fallacy by merely feeling benevolent. When I find that good men who are concerned about not punishing Germany are quite undisturbed about any dismemberment and annexation of Turkey, I grow involuntarily sceptical about their ethical basis. The people of Turkey, to all appearance, were incomparably less willing to be in this war than those of Germany; but almost nobody suggests plebiscites in *their* interest. Their feelings and their future resentments arouse practically no concern—ostensibly because they have a "guilty past." What then of Germany's?

Pacifists will be in no position to censure statesmen if they take shorter and narrower views than do wise statesmen. There is an ideal of justice as well as an ideal of pacification; and that, too, demands to be pacified. Nemesis cannot be evicted from the nature of things to save the feelings of guilty nations any more than to save the feelings of guilty individuals. And this is substantially the answer that seems to me to be called for by the pamphlet of Mr. Norman Angell, which, for the rest, so largely runs to repelling proposals that no Government has made or is likely to make. It is really not necessary to tell us that we cannot "annihilate" a nation of 60,000,000. The great merit of Mr. Norman Angell's past work for peace lay in his appeal to men's commonsense; and the present war is the most stupendous vindication of his thesis that war does not pay. Those who argue as if he had been contending that no nation should ever resist an aggression are merely demonstrating their own lack of understanding. But Mr. Angell's line of argument during *the* war seems to me to exhibit a failure to apply to the problem the same rational method that he applied to the problem of war in times of peace. Hence, among other things, my sense of a need for the present allocution.